(delivered
at meeting in Baghdad on 31 October 2008)
Iraqi CP: Our position towards Security Agreement
depends on
its content
and the
extent of responding to Iraqi people’s interests
The Iraqi CP leader, Hamid Majeed Mousa, the Secretary of the Central
Committee, spoke in detail about the party’s position regarding the Iraq-US
Agreement, and relevant issues and developments, during a meeting held in
Baghdad on 31 October 2008. He also answered questions from media
representatives.
The
following are extensive excerpts of the statement delivered by Comrade Mousa:
“We are living these days in sensitive moments in our contemporary political
history. The country is going through complex conditions, during which many
issues are raised, in particular, in recent days, the issue of the Iraq-US
Agreement; how to deal with it and what is the position towards it. Indeed, it
is one of the most important and serious problems, and a great deal depends on
proper performance by the Iraqi side and its adherence to patriotic
principles, for building our future; for the unified, independent democratic
and federal Iraq. This Agreement requires that all of us think deeply, discuss
its contents, proceedings and outcome in an objective and systematic manner,
with a realistic approach, far from unjustified over-reactions and convulsions
that would affect the work of reason and thinking deeply about what is going
on and what lies behind it.
We rejected
war and occupation
In determining
our position, we rely - as a Communist party – on our well-known methodology.
It was there when we rejected the option of war to change the situation in
Iraq. It was also present when we rejected the occupation and the UN Security
Council resolution that sanctioned the occupation. It will continue to be
present during the discussions about the Agreement and for restoring
independence and sovereignty.
Linked to previous observations, and before going into details about the
Agreement, let me make some points that deal with the position of the party,
to serve as the backdrop from which we move to determine our general position
towards the Agreement, without going into details and particulars:
1 – As known, in the aftermath of
April, 9, 2003, Iraq witnessed major changes after the regime collapsed, that
took place as result of adopting the war option through military invasion.
This cannot be forgotten, though it does not mean approval of it. We must not
forget the political consequences, well-known to all, that this option
entailed. What happened reflects, in large part, the tendency to hegemony and
domination, and the desire to control the world after the United States became
the sole power to decide the destiny of mankind, especially after the collapse
of the socialist camp and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The US,
since that moment, took decisions on its own and without any regard to the
will of others. Its policy and strategic interests always take precedence, for
it is not a charitable organization. It may be said that the US made it easier
for the Iraqis to get rid of the dictatorship, but, to avoid any confusion, it
is necessary to recall that it did not come to Iraq to achieve this task
(getting rid of dictatorship), but rather sought to use this to reconstruct
the world in accordance with its geopolitical and strategic interest, both
regional and global.
2 – When we
rejected the option of war, we were aware that change through war will bring
about complexities and complications that could make the realization of
democracy and achieving independence, more difficult and more complex. This is
what we have seen since the fall of the dictatorship. The country is suffering
from chaos, instability and lack of security, with no significant achievements
made in rebuilding and reconstruction. So that these remarks do not get
misinterpreted, it must be noted here that we were against the war option not
out of mercy for dictatorship, but out of mercy for our people, so that they
are spared further human and material losses. As it is well- known, we were
among the first of those who fought against dictatorship, and we raised our
slogan: No to War.. No to Dictatorship ...Yes to the Democratic Alternative!
That is, we had a realistic alternative for resolving the crisis of the
dictatorial regime.
Different
course of events
But, as well known, the real history of events took a different course, and we
had no alternative but to make use of the lessons and interact with the new
conditions. The dictatorial regime left the stage of history deserving no
pity, and Iraq was occupied, with this occupation being legitimized by UN
resolutions. The task since then has centered on how to restore to Iraq its
freedom, and its full sovereignty and independence.
After the fall
of the regime, we strived along with other parties that opposed the
dictatorship, to achieve national unity and hold a national conference
involving all anti-dictatorship forces, in order to set up a national unity
government, to be in charge of the transitional stage and accomplish its
tasks, towards restoring sovereignty and independence and laying the
foundations for building a democratic system. Based on our analysis of the
nature of the stage that emerged after the fall of the dictatorial regime, we
came to the conclusion that the central task facing our country in this stage
was twofold: To end the occupation and restore sovereignty and independence,
on the one hand, and lay the foundations for the construction of the new
system that ought to be democratic and constitute a real alternative to the
former regime, on the other.
However, because of narrow
interests of some Iraqi parties on the one hand, and because of hegemonic
tendencies of the occupation powers, the Americans, in cooperation with their
allies, rushed to pass UN Security Council Resolution No. 1483, that
legitimized foreign presence and the emergence of the occupation Coalition
Authority. In view of this new, complicated and complex, situation where a
host of local, regional and international factors interacted, the following
question was put forward: Should we, who had rejected the option of war,
refuse to work with other parties in order to achieve the afore-mentioned
central task, so as to pave the ground for rebuilding the country and form the
Iraqi national institutions that would help achieve the restoration of
sovereignty and independence?
Several
options
During that tumultuous period, with its risks and challenges, there were a
variety of options to deal with the new reality and the position towards the
occupation.
There were those who thought that we could take up arms. It is important for
me here to point out that we, as a Communist Party and based on its Marxist
methodology, proceed from the fact that different forms of struggle exist,
which ought to be mastered by the party, on the condition that it resorts to a
concrete analysis of the concrete situation when choosing the concrete form of
struggle. We are not, in principle, against the use of arms if the
circumstances dictate that; and we do not ban it as a form of struggle. This
decision was not purely theoretical for us, for we had taken up arms for long
years, fought the dictatorship, and offered hundreds and thousands of martyrs
in the struggle to defend the party and speed up the overthrow of
dictatorship. We were not afraid to use this form of struggle. But it must not
be played with, in an irresponsible manner; rather one must master the moment
of its use, if and when other means fail to achieve the goals of the party.
When conviction, especially, exists among the masses, and when conditions are
ready, and the balance of forces helps; and when other forms fail to achieve
the target (or targets), then the resistance can be armed. Otherwise, in
contravention of the above conditions, and under the prevailing balance of
forces, and with conditions for peaceful political struggle existing, taking
up arms would not only be wrong but would be a sin, and often turns into a
crime, especially if its forces and efforts are combined with terrorism and
terrorists, against the higher interests of society.
Therefore, our
Party chose, at this historic and dangerous moment in the history of our
country, the path of peaceful struggle and preparing the conditions for ending
the occupation and the evacuation of foreign troops from our territory. We
chose this path while recognizing that it is a complex and difficult path, and
would even cause a lot of complications and negative attitudes. We have
adopted this option, although we know it is complex because it is the correct
option which we are striving to consolidate at the present moment. Because it
is in the best interests of our country, away from the flashy slogans that
have no credibility in the dynamic of reality, and away from running behind
emotions. Iraqis have suffered from the evils of wars and their horrors, and
from the destruction to which they were subjected, and a realistic politician
cannot but take into account these facts when drawing up policy and deciding
positions.
In the light of the above-mentioned facts, and based on our methodology in
evaluating events and formulating positions, we decided to engage in a
peaceful political process. While developing our positions, we were aware of
the nature of that stage; its sensitivity, dangers and difficulties. But we
were convinced that it is the possible path in the complex conditions in which
we are living.
Regional and
international factors
Of course, it should be noted here that the complexity of this process was not
a product of purely local factors but also the product of regional factors, in
addition of course to international factors, particularly the American role
and its global strategies for reconstructing the world and shaping it in
accordance with the neo-conservatives’ vision.
As we focus attention here on the regional role and the position of
neighboring states, it is necessary to put forward the following question: Was
it expected of these states to take the right position and leave us alone to
rebuild our country, and even to support the new political process that began
after the disappearance of the former regime?
The answer to
this question is: No. Everyone believes that its security is linked to what is
happening in Iraq. Regardless of the differences in degree, our neighbors
believe that the development of events in Iraq will lead to negative
consequences that have an impact on their countries. The problem is that some
of the neighbors drew conclusions that their turn will come after Iraq. We
therefore see that, in order to avert possible dangers, they planned to get
the Americans "embroiled" more and more in the "Iraqi quagmire", as they say,
regardless, alas, of the suffering of the Iraqi people and the victims that
fall daily. It can be said, most unfortunately, that this equation had a
negative effect, not only on Iraq but also on the states of the region. This
is what we have suffered, and continue to suffer, and will pay the price even
as we negotiate, from a genuine patriotic position, with the Americans to get
a fair security agreement that endorses the right to self-determination in
accordance with the UN Charter, and in accordance with international law, and
secures for the Iraqis sovereignty, independence and final exit of foreign
forces from Iraqi territory.
These remarks, and others too, were necessary to know the basis for our
position with regard to the Agreement itself.
Prerequisites
for the evacuation of foreign troops
As well-known, we are among the forces that have sought to provide the
material and political prerequisites and conditions for conducting
negotiations and a serious dialogue with the occupiers, with representatives
of foreign powers, and with the UN, to ensure the evacuation of foreign troops
and an end to the subjugation of Iraq to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, to
convince the relevant international bodies and the Security Council that Iraq
is no longer a country that threatens international peace and security; that
all sanctions taken against it since 1990 are no longer justified nor
acceptable, and that the abnormal situation is no longer acceptable in the new
conditions.
We have sought
and called for providing the political prerequisites. I mean by that: building
national unity, building political institutions, activating the process of
reconciliation, and creating a favorable atmosphere that would help everybody
to agree on common denominators and serving the supreme national interest,
away from narrow partisanship and subjective and selfish tendencies that have
exhausted the Iraqis over the past five years, through illegitimate and
unacceptable struggles that undermined the cohesion of forces, the rebuilding
of the country and the restoration of security and stability. We stressed that
narrow partisanship and selfish limited benefits must not be made a basis for
determining political positions. We emphasized that the higher interests of
the homeland must prevail over other interests. This certainly does not mean
we do not see the differences and disagreements between the forces, for this
is the nature of things in the present circumstances with their complexity.
But the problem is how to conduct the conflict of interests? Is it managed
through violence, bigotry, extremism and entrenched positions, or through
democratic means that guarantee the right to differ without this being a
constraint on reaching understandings on major national issues, and to rely on
the opinion of the people and their fundamental interests in major
conjunctures.
These are
fundamental prerequisites to enter into negotiations and to enable the Iraqi
negotiators to get better negotiating terms that coincide with the higher
interests of the Iraqi people and deal with the repercussions in the event of
concluding the agreement. It is not possible to reach a balanced agreement
without taking into account the current and future interest of our people. We
must therefore exercise the highest degree of responsibility and political
skill when negotiating, so as to achieve the main goal: the evacuation of
foreign troops from Iraqi territory and the restoration of sovereignty and
independence.
With regard to
providing the material prerequisites, we have sought - as a Communist Party –
through various measures to create a favorable atmosphere and broad national
relations. We have also called for building our armed forces on criteria of
competence, professionalism and patriotism. This is especially important
because that the level of readiness of the Iraqi armed forces has been used as
the main pretext by the foreign troops to stay in the country, citing the lack
of security and stability, and claiming that their presence is for the purpose
of maintaining security and order, because our armed forces have not yet
attained the actual level of readiness to replace those foreign troops in
maintaining security and order and combating the terrorists who have shown
signs of revival recently.
How do we
decide ... and how do we act?
In the face of this reality, the question is: How do we decide, and how do we
act and work to respond to these pretexts and foil this argument? We have
stressed on many occasions that building the Iraqi armed forces, and so as to
replace the foreign troops, must take place on a national basis, turning away
from the quota system whose failure has been shown by events, and away from
penetration and using the armed forces for one special plan or another.
Building our armed forces on a national basis means that they must be the
defender of the homeland, its borders, constitution and democracy. They must
be a competent alternative to the foreign forces. Building these forces on the
basis of such principles would help in bringing closer the evacuation of
foreign troops, and thus the restoration of sovereignty and independence, full
and intact.
This is how we have been working,
and we still are. We are therefore facing an urgent and dangerous task: of
preparing the prerequisites for drafting a proper agreement that secures for
the Iraqis their legitimate national rights. Moreover, we have been and
continue to be aware of the lack of parity between the two parties; the Iraqi
and American, for a number of well-known reasons. But we do not see this
imbalance as static, but as one that can be moved, transformed and influenced
by creating the conditions that enable the Iraqi negotiators to perform well,
through the mobilization of the masses of people and involving them in this
battle. This requires two things:
1 - Transparency and openness.
It is not in the interest of the Iraqi negotiating team for the negotiations
to take place behind closed doors and without informing the Iraqi public and
its representatives in all their diversity and colors, and without listening
to the opinions of specialists who can provide support for the Iraqi
delegation in its negotiations with a side that has substantial experience,
especially that of signing about 100 other treaties in other parts of the
world, similar to this Agreement.
2
- Relying on the public opinion to generate support for demands, and for
demanding amendments to articles and decisions. This would help to get better
positions and more favorable conditions.
Negotiating
skills
Unfortunately, the preparations and negotiations have not taken place as
indicated above. They have been shrouded in uncertainty, lack of clarity and
lack of transparency. Access to the draft agreement has also been delayed.
While not questioning the efficiency and patriotism of the Iraqi negotiators,
it must be noted here that a more competent and experiences delegation could
have been formed. If there had been a collective opinion, we would have opened
it up to other forces, parties and experts from different backgrounds and
trends, and we could have ensured the formation of a delegation that is more
competent and responsive to Iraqi demands. This raises another question:
Was there
someone not skilled at negotiating? It can be said, through following the
statements issued by some Iraqi officials, that announced daily and at the
critical moment that they were wholeheartedly with the Agreement, and that
what happened was the best that could be obtained, that there was a fault with
our delegation. Otherwise, such voices would not have emerged. How can a
government official, at a time when the government was going through one of
the most delicate and complex moments, announce that the Agreement in its
present form is sufficient and does not need to be amended! This at a time
when the majority of political forces were insisting that the Agreement as it
stood, despite the amendments and improvements that had been introduced, and
the many demands made by the Iraqi side, was still lacking essential elements
that would make the idea of sovereignty and independence, and the exit of
foreign troops at the specified time, an established fact.
We go back
now to the question of how to elaborate the position towards the Agreement in
its present form, and what are the opinions of the Iraqi Communist Party about
it?
Our realistic approach
In answering this question, an important point must be noted. We, in the Iraqi
Communist Party, for a long time now, do not deal with issues on the basis of
a policy of total rejection. Rather we deal with things with a realistic
approach, viewing them from the perspective of their conformity with the
interests of our people and our ability to obtain gains that serve their
development and reconstruction. If we can, through a certain plan or in
discussing some document, obtain our people’s rights, then we do not hesitate
to support it, and will endeavor to implement it in the best way possible.
This agreement will be evaluated on the basis of the above-stated remarks. If
the document does not meet the demands of our people, we will reject it
immediately and openly, without hesitation, but on the basis of proper and
deep assessment, not only with regard to the Agreement and its clauses, but
also regarding what surrounds it. To be more precise, we have made up our mind
in the discussions: it is not a question of whether not or there should be an
agreement. Our position depends on the content of this agreement, and to what
extent it responds to the interests of our people. We also need to take
into account two other elements:
1 – The
presence of foreign troops has become a matter of fact and the occupation was
internationally legitimized through UN Security Council Resolution 1483. This
was done against the will of the Iraqi people.
2 - We have not yet provided all the favorable prerequisites and conditions.
Therefore, there
has to be an agreement that ensures the evacuation of the foreign troops.
These troops are present under UN resolutions and their evacuation cannot take
place by total rejection. It must be regulated by an agreement between the two
sides. In all countries, regardless of the situation where there are foreign
troops, their exit does not take place by only ignoring mutual dialogue and
talks, but through an agreement. What matters, therefore, is the content of
such an agreement, and what the principles and basis were for concluding it.
This is the correct approach. So we're trying, along with other national
forces, inside and outside the political process, to reach an agreement that
governs the withdrawal of foreign forces and their operation during the
interim transitional period. This was the demand of the patriotic forces from
the outset: i.e. scheduling the withdrawal of foreign forces. Scheduling
means, among other things, that there should be a document regulating this
process; this movement and this withdrawal, and the gradual transfer of
authorities and responsibilities to the Iraqi national side. We strive to
ensure that this document reflects the will of Iraqis and their aspiration to
see a clear end, unequivocally, of the foreign presence, without delays,
procrastination and cumbersome conditions.
The presence of
foreign troops is something that has, unfortunately, been imposed on the
Iraqis. Several parties bear responsibility for this, first of which is the
dictatorship that led Iraq into this mess and the subsequent repercussions.
Then comes the UN Security Council and the resolutions it issued as a result
of the hegemony of the unipolar order and the United States. Finally, we have
the Arab countries that brag and shout against the agreement, and consider its
signing to be a "violation" of Iraqi sovereignty - yet, many of these
countries have signed agreements that are more problematic than the present
agreement.
What we want
We want a clearly-defined agreement. Thus, when the new draft agreement was
presented to us, we expressed our opinion clearly in the Political Council for
National Security and in the Council of Ministers, as well as in various
media. We did not reject it totally as we did not accept it totally, but we
started from the need to carefully study the submitted draft. We have already
done that, reached a number of points and presented them in writing to those
concerned.
Before presenting a summary of the
points we have presented, we stressed that an agreement is needed that does
not involve any ambiguity, or ambiguous language. The contents of its clauses
must not be open to various interpretations, contradictory or contradicting
each other. We want the terms of the presence of foreign forces to be set out
clearly. They must not have absolute powers, without bounds and regulations,
and not subject to inspection and control by the Iraqi forces and authorities.
Their movement and operations must all be conducted in coordination with the
Iraqi side, supervised by it, and liable to Iraq’s national decisions,
contrary to what the situation is today. According to previous accords, and
the UN Security Council Resolution, the foreign forces are in command
militarily and in charge of security matters, with the Iraqi forces being part
of the “Coalition forces”. I am repeating this point in order to understand
later what we mean by the difference between the Agreement and calling for an
extension (of the UN Security Council mandate for Multinational Forces in
Iraq).. So that some may not think that an extension of the mandate is better
than having an agreement. An extension of the mandate would mean complete
control by foreign forces and the subordination of Iraqi forces to them. What
is required, however, is an agreement that sets a clearly-defined timetable
for the departure of foreign forces.
·
It should
be noted that the latest draft of the agreement has contained some new
aspects:
·
The
withdrawal of foreign troops from cities and towns, to re-assemble at
locations that are specified in advance.
·
The
obligation to protect Iraqi funds, and preventing claimants from having access
to them. It is noteworthy that we made a proposal that such protection should
include all funds, not only oil revenues, and that it should not be confined
to the United States but include all countries in the world.
Stressing that
Iraq would not be a platform for launching aggression or a conduit for
interference in the affairs of neighboring states.
These points and others are regarded as a development and an improvement
compared to previously presented drafts. But, nevertheless, it needs further
amendments, which led us to present a memorandum containing our comments and
proposals. These proposals have been included, along with the notes made by
other Iraqi national forces, in a unified memorandum that was endorsed by the
Council of Ministers two days ago to serve as a basis for negotiating with the
American side.
Remarks and
Proposals
Below are our remarks and
proposals for some amendments to the Agreement regarding the temporary
presence of US forces in Iraq, and also the "Strategic framework agreement for
the relationship of friendship between the Republic of Iraq and the United
States of America."
First of all, there is a need for a general note. The negotiation process
suffered from a fundamental weakness. The negotiating process focused on
versions that had been prepared by the American side, whereas the formulation
of the terms of the agreement should have been done jointly, and the Iraqi
side should have prepared its own views. There is a definite need for
amendments because the agreement must reflect consensus of the two sides, and
it is clear that the current version does not have the full approval of the
Iraqi side, despite containing several positive points.
Proposed
amendments to the "Strategic Framework Agreement"
Paragraph (2) of Section 11 – “Final Provisions”, states that the Agreement
remains in force unless one of the two parties submits a written notice to the
other party. We see the need for specifying a period of time for this
agreement too, 3-5 years, for example. There is concern that the time frame of
this agreement may be used to circumvent the timetable of the Agreement on the
temporary presence of foreign forces.
.
Proposed
amendments to the Agreement on the Temporary Presence of U.S. Forces
Article Two - Definitions
Paragraph (1): We propose deleting the last sentence of the paragraph,
beginning with: "The installations and areas agreed upon also include those
areas and installations that might be offered to the U.S. forces during the
period of this agreement and for the exclusive tasks of this agreement, in
accordance to what the two sides agree upon.”
The reason for
deleting this sentence is that it allows an open-ended increase of the
installations and areas used by the US forces, without limitation.
Paragraph (4): There is a need to for a clear definition of the term
"Civilian members", so that it does not include private security companies.
Paragraph (5): The definition of "U.S. contractors" needs to be
narrowed so that it does not include, in an open-ended manner, subcontractors
and employees, unless in agreement with the Iraqi government.
Article Three
– Rule of Law
Paragraph (1):
1. To delete the words "must follow" in the first line, to read as follows:
"All members of the U.S. armed forces and civilian members must abide by Iraqi
laws…”.
2. To delete the last sentence of the same paragraph: "It is the
responsibility of the U.S. to take all necessary measures to ensure this."
Article Five
– Property Ownership
Paragraph (2):
·
To delete
the sentence: "The U.S. forces will consult with the Iraqi authorities
regarding construction, remodeling, and modification. The U.S. will seek… ”.
·
To delete
the word "major", in the fourth sentence.
·
To add the
word "and obtain" in the third line, so that the sentence now reads:
".. and obtain the Iraqi
government’s approval for construction or modification projects.”
Article Seven
– Condition and Storage of defense equipments
In the 5th and 6th lines, to delete "… and are not
connected directly or indirectly .." [in the Arabic version]. To be
replaced by: "... and are not related directly or indirectly ...".
Article
Nine
- Movement of vehicles, ships, and airplanes
Paragraph (2):
In the penultimate line, to delete: "... and they cannot be searched ...".
To add,
somewhere in the agreement, a reference to the possibility of carrying out a
search in coordination between the two sides.
Paragraph (5):
To delete the last sentence in the paragraph: “Airplanes and ships are not
subject to any search, ...”.
To compensate
for this by using the above-stated proposal, referring to the possibility of
carrying out a search in coordination between the two sides.
Article
Twelve
– Legal Jurisdictions
Paragraph (2):
To check what is meant by "major"
crimes. Cases must be clearly defined so that the violations are subject to
the definitions of Iraqi law. Unclear explanations must not be adopted.
Procedures according to Iraqi law must be adopted.
Paragraph (3): Delete the phrase: "... the primary right ...". [in
Arabic version].
Paragraph (5): This paragraph completely negates the content of
paragraph (2). We believe that it should be deleted altogether.
Article
Fifteen
- Importing and Exporting
Paragraph (1):
This paragraph
is loose and not well-defined, and is thus open to manipulation in terms of
the imports and exports not being subject to search. It is therefore a kind of
breach of sovereignty, and there is no definition of the nature of the exports
and the need for exporting. We therefore call for the deletion of the term
"export" from this paragraph, or to have a specific definition of what can be
exported.
Article Nineteen
- Support Services
Paragraph (1):
The paragraph refers to the
possibility of creating and managing activities and entities inside the
installations and areas agreed upon, and the entities include post offices and
financial services. Does this mean the possibility of creating branches for
banks? If this is the case, to what extent they would be subject to the
control of the Iraqi Central Bank?
Article
Twenty One
- Claims
Paragraph (1):
·
In the
last line of the paragraph, to delete: "their official duties", and to replace
it with: "military operations”.
The purpose of
this amendment is to ensure that the waiving of claims regarding violations
committed by the American troops does not extend to periods prior to the
Agreement.
·
This
Article puts Iraqi and American civilians on an equal footing in treatment,
whereas the American civilians enjoy protection in the articles of the
Agreement, without containing something similar for Iraqi civilians. We
therefore call for deleting the term "civilians" from this article, so that
waiving the right to claim includes the military only.
Article
Twenty Five
- Withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq
Paragraph (5):
Delete the
whole paragraph.
[N.B.:
Paragraph (5) reads as follows: “ 5- Before the end of the period
mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article, and based on the Iraqi assessment of
conditions, the Iraqi government is permitted to ask the U.S. government to
keep specific forces for the purposes of training and support of the Iraqi
security forces. In such a case, a special agreement will be negotiated and
signed by both sides in accordance to laws and constitutional requirements in
both countries. Or, the Iraqi government might ask for an extension of
paragraph 1 of this article, and that can be done in accordance to paragraph 2
of article Thirty-One of this agreement.” ]
Article Twenty Six - Procedures to end the implementation of
Chapter 7 on Iraq
In the penultimate line of the article, delete "... will make its best to help
Iraq ...",
And replace with: "will, by virtue of its position in the UN Security Council,
take…".
So that the
sentence would read as follows:
"Both sides confirm that the U.S., by virtue of its position in the Security
Council, will take the necessary steps to accomplish that by December 31st
of 2008."
Article Twenty Seven
– Iraqi Assets
To add the following sentence
in the
penultimate line: "and other exports of Iraqi origin", so that the sentence
would read:
"... , the U.S. continues to be committed to helping Iraq regarding the
request submitted to the Security Council asking for protection arrangements
to Iraq’s oil and gas productions, their revenue, and other exports of Iraqi
origin, ...".
_______________________
These are the
comments and proposals of our Party. Here, one must point out that the
American side spares no effort and does not refrain from using illegitimate
and sometimes deceitful means to put pressure on the Iraqi side, to compel it
to sign the agreement as it is, or to accept the fewest possible and formal
amendments. There is also the big media campaign that employs a lot of means
and media. If you follow the American media, you would be amazed. Along with
this campaign, and in the same vein, many Arab and regional players have acted
in the same direction. Despite the different intentions of this country or
that, they have used various means to exert pressure and psychological warfare
on the Iraqi side and the Iraqi negotiators, instead of providing positive
support to strengthen its position and act as brothers or allies so as to help
improve the negotiating position of the Iraqi side.
Mixed
reactions
The agreement is
therefore still in the process of being negotiated, and there are mixed
reactions. These include reactions of the American administration, mostly
negative, with some going as far as implicit threats, others being explicit,
saying that Iraq would revert to the state of chaos; would lose a lot as a
result of not signing the agreement; would lose aid, support and arms; and its
funds abroad would be plundered. But a careful analysis of things and a
correct knowledge of the prevailing balance of forces at the concrete moment,
especially with regard to the American side, allows the conclusion that the
threatening and escalation is nothing but “hollow drums" intended to
intimidate and influence the Iraqi negotiators to force them to relent and
submit to the demands and conditions of the American side. In addition, at the
same time there are statements issued by some American officials that indicate
they will not hesitate to listen to the Iraqis’ point of view.
It should be
noted here that the Americans are living through a state of confusion and
uncertainty, and the negotiations are taking place during a sensitive moment
for American policy. There are presidential elections and the intensified
rivalry between the Democratic and Republican parties, and between their
candidates for the presidency: Obama and McCain. The issue of how to deal with
the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq has thus become a sensitive issue there.
This means that we cannot keep the negotiations away from what is happening in
the United States. The demand for the need to reduce the U.S. presence in Iraq
and for the scheduling of the withdrawal is a pressing factor in the
presidential elections and for the American position. Obama’s program, which
he put forward regarding the military presence in Iraq, is perhaps closer and
more appropriate, but we must not lose sight of our objective by being drawn
to this candidate or that, for the policy in the U.S. is not decided by this
president or that, and the President-elect does not necessarily adhere to his
pledges. This policy is rather the product of specialized institutions, and
the outcome of diverse interests and contradictory interests, that end up in
grand accords that express the fundamental interests of the United States in
the concrete historical period.
Country’s
higher interests are top priority
In conclusion, our country’s rights must be seized by employing logic and
argument, and resorting to international law, not by screaming or declaring in
advance a position of rejection of any issue. It is therefore imperative to
continue efforts, to ensure proper selection of the proposed formulas, and
amend the formula that is now proposed. We hope that there will be concerted
efforts by all the patriotic forces that are concerned with the political
future of Iraq and Iraqi-US relations. They should think deeply and act
properly, and refrain from giving priority to their own interests. On the
contrary, our essential concern must be to think of the higher interests of
our homeland and people as they wage the battle for achieving their
independence and sovereignty.
We need to
mention an important issue here. There are, alas, some forces that make their
own position towards the Maliki government as the basis for determining their
positions regarding the security agreement between Iraq and the United States.
These forces may have been subjected to harm, marginalization or damage; and
there is no room here to go into the details of the reasons that led to this,
and they should have been dealt with in a better way. But this does not
justify at all that they view things in such a narrow manner, by considering
the position towards the Maliki government as the fundamental thing, while the
position regarding the agreement takes second place. The higher interests of
the country must be the basis and criterion in determining the position
towards the agreement, rather than the differences between the parties of the
political process. It is therefore essential, first and foremost, to support
the efforts that help Iraq to get a fair and balanced agreement that secures
its legitimate rights in accordance with international law, in the forefront
of which is to exercise its right to self-determination, build the system of
its choice, and regain its full sovereignty and independence.
.
Alternatives
The current draft of the security agreement is still a subject of contention,
the war of nerves is continuing, and the Iraqi delegation continues to put
forward its demands regarding amending the draft. Many raise a question: what
are the alternatives?
- There are some who exaggerate things, pointing out that not signing the
agreement will lead to the possibility of the return of chaos, and the sudden
withdrawal of U.S. forces at a time when the Iraqi forces are not ready yet.
But we wonder: Is this approach rational and possible? The answer is No;
because it is not consistent with reality, and is also not in line with the
reality of the goals for which the U.S. has come to Iraq. Departure, in the
manner presented by these people, would mean defeat, and the Americans do not
want that.
- Others, meanwhile, talk about the possibility of a military coup taking
place, bringing to power elements who are close to or sympathetic with the
United States, and impose an agreement that secures the strategic interests of
that country in Iraq. But it must be noted that conditions in Iraq,
internationally, and also in the U.S., make the notion of a coup something
difficult. The prospects for carrying out this option are slim, although it
cannot be written off.
- On the other hand, there are those who believe, in order to avoid signing
the agreement, that it is necessary to return to the UN resolutions. This
means a return to square one, from which we started after 9 April, 2008. The
UN resolutions do not have a specified time limit, and do not adhere to a
clearly-defined timetable for the evacuation of foreign troops; and therefore
do not speak about restoring sovereignty.
Our
Position
As far as we are concerned, we would like to emphasize the following aspects:
1 – We are not among the supporters of absolute acceptance or absolute
rejection. We are for the option of insisting on amending the current draft
of the agreement, and there are real possibilities. If we consider the issue
properly, unify our own forces, and make use of the regional, international
and even American factors; by the correct employment of the contradictions
emerging between these factors over Iraq, then we will be able to get a fair
agreement that secures sovereignty and independence, provides the right to
self-determination, and ensures a timetable for the evacuation of foreign
troops. This is what we are working on and fighting for.
2 – Our Party is seeking, with others, to amend the agreement, because it is
unacceptable in Iraqi society in its current draft. It will also not pass in
the Parliament in this format, and we will be the first to reject it.
3 - If the American side accepts the proposed amendments, then we will have a
positive position, in principle, towards the agreement. But not before seeing
the amendments and their main content, and whether they agree with what the
Iraqis want.
4 – We are counting on amending the agreement, but we believe that this will
not be without the mobilization of public opinion in support of the amending
and paying attention to the popular pressure. We do not want to play the role
of spectator in this battle.
5 – Any option other than amending the agreement is not our option. If
circumstances impose other things, we shall have our say then. It should be
noted that we will not accept the spreading of chaos or a military coup.
6 - We will not accept any secret agreement or secret annexes. Everything must
be presented to the people. "
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